Citizenship in pre-modern Eurasia: a comparison between China, the Near East and Europe by Prak, Maarten
  
Maarten Prak 
Citizenship in pre-modern Eurasia: a 
comparison between China, the Near East 
and Europe 
 
Conference Item [eg. keynote lecture, etc.] 
 
 
Original citation: 
Prak, Maarten (2011) Citizenship in pre-modern Eurasia: a comparison between China, the Near 
East and Europe. In: Modern and comparative economic history seminar, 24th November 2011, 
London School of Economics and Political Science. (Unpublished) 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39751/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2011 
 
© 2011 The author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 1
Citizenship in Pre-modern Eurasia: 
A Comparison between China, the Near East and 
Europe 
 
Maarten Prak 
 
Utrecht University  
m.prak@uu.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
‘Good’ institutions are now often portrayed as a precondition for economic development 
and growth. This paper revisits an old thesis, first articulated by Max Weber, that 
citizenship explains why Europe managed to modernise and Asian societies did not. Like 
Weber, the paper focuses on urban citizenship, but uses a broader definition than he did. 
The paper finds that although Asian towns did not have legal citizenship, they displayed 
many more characteristics of citizenship-as-practice than Weber and his followers 
allowed for. It also finds that European towns often were less autonomous than Weber 
assumed. Economic development and growth in the pre-modern era were not so much 
determined by citizenship per se, but by the way towns and urban interests could be 
articulated at state level.
 2
The Argument 
In works on the economic development of the pre-modern world, institutions have come 
to occupy an increasingly important place. The towering figure in this development is, of 
course, Douglass North. His main argument has been to underline the commitment (or 
lack of it) by states to private property as a prerequisite for economic growth.1 Other 
authors have emphasised the importance of aggressive economic policies by European 
states, and its absence in other parts of Eurasia. Much of this has turned the traditional 
wisdoms upside down: where pre-modern states were once seen as predators, trying to 
scoop up as much rents as they could, it is now suggested that China and India might 
actually have been suffering from too little state, rather than too much.2 Some of these 
arguments, not least those of North himself, sit somewhat uncomfortably with the recent 
research on pre-modern European state formation, which has tended to emphasise that the 
late medieval and early modern state was first and foremost a war-machine. ‘States made 
war, and war made states’, as American sociologist Charles Tilly succinctly summarised 
the debate.3 ‘Good institutions’ are thus narrowed down to institutions that increased state 
revenue and supported state borrowing. 
Political scientists and sociologist, in the meantime, have in recent years been 
emphasising, once again, the importance of civic institutions for the success of societies 
in terms of delivering prosperity and well-being for their members. How can we square 
this with the tough diet of war, destruction and taxation that pre-modern European states 
were delivering instead? In the book that will eventually include this paper as a final 
chapter, I want to focus attention on the towns and cities that were by common consent 
the incubators of the dynamic of European societies in the run-up to the Industrial 
Revolution and Modern Economic Growth. This is, in itself, not exactly a novel idea. 
After all, Max Weber made precisely the same point almost a century ago. I will, 
however, amend his thesis in two significant ways. First of all, contrary to Weber’s 
argument, these presumably unique features of European cities failed to deliver economic 
dynamism and social well-being in large parts of Europe itself. Secondly, the book will 
                                                 
* I want to thank Debin Ma and Şevket Pamuk (both LSE) for discussing an earlier draft of the paper with 
me at short notice. All mistakes are mine alone. 
1 E.g. North and Weingast (1989). 
2 Vries (2003), &&; Rosenthal and Wong (2011), ch. 6; Parthasarathi (2011), ch. 5. 
3 Tilly (1992). 
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try to demonstrate that much of what Weber saw as unique features of European cities 
can also be found in the cities of the Near East and Asia. Clearly, another factor than just 
citizenship, or civil society, was at play. This factor, I will argue, was the particular 
relationship between local—i.e. urban—and national governance. Only where states were 
so organised that urban institutions could impact significantly on state policies, did the 
effects that Weber—or for that matter Douglass North—predicted in fact materialise.  
Recent research on pre-modern towns, within and outside Europe, has been 
dominated by the social history of elites. Historians of these urban elites have time and 
again made the point that small oligarchies monopolised urban politics.4 I want to argue, 
however, that the role of ‘ordinary people’ in urban politics has been systematically 
under-estimated, and that civic institutions directly or indirectly helped shape local 
politics in most pre-modern towns. There was, in other words, more ‘democracy’ before 
the French Revolution than has usually been acknowledged by historians, fixated as they 
are on national politics. Popular influence was, moreover, greatest where it mattered 
most: in local institutions where public services were shaped and delivered. I have called 
these ‘common people’ citizens. Citizenship is a slippery concept. Suffice it to say at this 
point that I have chosen to employ Charles Tilly’s definition of citizenship as ‘a 
continuous series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which 
each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the person’s 
membership in an exclusive category and (2) the agent’s relation to the state rather than 
any authority the agent may enjoy’.5 This definition implies that formal citizen status is 
seen as one, but in no way the only form of relationship between a state (or in the period 
covered here more often a town) and its inhabitants. Models of citizenship, I will argue, 
made the difference between more and less successful societies. Successful societies, 
incidentally, are those societies, that produce the greatest amount of prosperity and well-
being for their citizens, within the limitations imposed by the available resources and 
technology. It is assumed—which at this point is not exactly a minor point—that these 
conditions were roughly equal throughout Eurasia during the period under consideration.6 
                                                 
4 Friedrichs (2000), 17. 
5 Tilly (1995), 8. 
6 Pomeranz (2001). 
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To talk about more and less successful societies implies comparison. To 
demonstrate the validity of the book’s argument, three different types of comparisons will 
be deployed. The first part will be looking at the ways in which European towns were 
ruled, how their citizens were organised, and at some of the public services that were 
delivered to them. The main point here will be that there were no fundamental differences 
in local models of citizenship and urban governance across pre-modern Europe. The 
second part of the book will compare the various European models of state-city 
relationships. Special attention will be paid to those polities which experimented with 
novel forms of that relationship, especially Italy, the Low Countries and England. The 
argument will be that these three regions were quite exceptional, and therefore in no way 
representative of European developments. In many European countries states increasingly 
controlled urban communities in ways that are reminiscent of what Weber described as 
the Asian model. The third part will focus on Asia and the Near East,7 in an attempt to 
tease out the specificity of what was happening in Europe. In this part I will argue that the 
other regions of Eurasia in many ways resembled on a local level the patterns found in 
pre-modern Europe, and on a national level the models of rule that prevailed in the 
majority of European countries. The remainder of the paper is concerned with this last 
comparison and investigates how Europe’s citizenship model—that is, in so far as it had 
one—measured up against those in other regions of Eurasia.  
In doing so, we return to the ideas first developed by Max Weber (1864-1920) in 
the early twentieth century, ideas which have maintained a powerful hold over histories 
of non-European areas, and likewise over interpretations of the varying trajectories of 
economic and social development experienced by these areas. In a nutshell Weber’s 
argument is that the emergence of modern society in Europe was the result of this unique 
feature of Western society: citizenship.8 In Weber’s definition, towns distinguished 
themselves from the countryside in five aspects. They had 1. fortifications, 2. markets, 3. 
their own courts of justice, 4. associations of inhabitants, and finally 5. (partial) self-
governance.9 Weber did not claim that all aspects were always found in all European 
towns. Nor did he claim that these features were unique to Western towns. Indeed, he 
                                                 
7 I hope to include Japan and South Asia at some later point as well. 
8 Weber (1978), 1240. 
9 Weber (1978), 1226 
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acknowledged that Asiatic towns shared many features with their European counterparts. 
They had, for instance, professional organisations that looked very much like guilds. The 
same was true for the towns of the Near East. However, these organisations were not 
bound together in that super-guild that was the European corporate town.10 
 Corporate status permitted the citizens to develop common policies of their own. 
They were not, or only to limited extent, subject to the directives of a central government. 
The corporation or commune in the West was a substitute for the empires, castes and 
tribes, as they existed in non-Western societies.11 These over-arching social structures 
prohibited the emergence of communes in the non-Western world; their absence was a 
precondition for the rise of the commune in medieval Italy and subsequently in the rest of 
Europe.12 In the original commune all citizens were equal, but that did not last very long. 
The well-to-do were the only citizens with sufficient leisure time to devote to public 
affairs, and quite rapidly they monopolised municipal offices. In some cases this was 
formalised by the creation of patrician guild with an exclusive claim to municipal 
offices.13 
 Weber’s discussion of the rise of the patriciate already casts a huge question mark 
over his concept of citizenship. If ordinary citizens had so little to say in the public affairs 
of their hometowns, what then did it mean to be a citizen? What was the fundamental 
difference between being subject to a prince or to a patriciate? Or did he want to say that 
only the patricians were genuine citizens? It has also been suggested that his discussion 
of the European town was in several dimensions an idealisation. Weber emphasised that 
citizens defended their own towns, but this was not quite true after the Middle Ages, 
when professional armies became more prominent.14 He has been criticised for creating 
too much of a uniform picture of the Western as well as of the Oriental city.15 More 
importantly perhaps, our knowledge of European urban history has increased massively 
                                                 
10 Weber (1978), 1226-33. 
11 Nippel, (2000), 25-26.  
12 Weber (1978), 1241, 1248-49. 
13 Weber (1978), 1281-82. 
14 Nippel (1991), 27-28. 
15 Isin (2005). 
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since Weber wrote his work, which was a development of the argument of his PhD-thesis 
from 1889.16 
Setting up such a comparison, requires us to steer clear of the formal definitions 
of citizenship as the documented membership of an urban commune as it was used by 
Weber himself. There can be no doubt that such a form of citizenship was not available 
elsewhere, and if this would be the benchmark, we could wrap up the paper at this point 
and move on to a more fruitful use of our time. However, as Bin Wong already pointed 
out in 1997, this type of comparisons inevitably leads to conclusions of European 
superiority, because they employ culturally embedded concepts from the European 
experience as if they were generally applicable.17 This is precisely the reason why I have 
applied a more open definition of citizenship as a set of political, economic and social 
practices. We will focus on four dimensions of citizenship-as-practice: local politics, 
guild organisations, poor relief and urban defence. 
One event that, at least initially, passed by almost all of the non-European areas—
Egypt being the main exception—was the French Revolution. Whereas this marked a 
clear break in the political history of continental Europe, with major implications for the 
development of its citizenship regimes, no such rupture happened in the regions 
discussed in this paper. For that reason I have accepted evidence from the nineteenth 
century for the history of pre-modern citizenship in these areas. This is important, 
because especially in China, the sources and by implication the historical literature tends 
to become more haphazard the further we go back in time. Obviously, we cannot assume 
China or the Near East to have been static (another mistake often made by neo-Weberian 
authors), and have to be alert to the possibility that nineteenth-century observations were 
the outcome of recent changes. 
 
1. Europe (very briefly) 
Somewhere around AD 1000 an urban revival got underway in much of Europe. In the 
process European towns acquired extensive rights (often called ‘freedoms’) which 
allowed them, among other things, to set up their own local government. These privileges 
                                                 
16 Nippel (1991), 20. 
17 Wong (1997). 
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were granted by the sovereign and almost everywhere subject to revocation. Throughout 
the period sovereigns would exercise their right to withdraw or amend urban privileges, 
not just in East-Central Europe, but also in seventeenth-century France and England.18 
 Urban governance: European towns were governed in a variety of ways, but 
almost without exception by a collective of people with formal citizen status.19 Next to a 
small executive (called ‘magistrate’ in many towns, combining judicial and 
administrative tasks) there would be a council, and often also a second, broader council 
with representatives of the community that had to approve for example new taxation. A 
surprising number of towns held annual elections for the most significant municipal 
offices. Next to the core institutions of municipal governance a host of other, semi-
private order institutions were involved in running the towns. These included foundations 
(mainly in welfare and health care), craft guilds, and neighbourhood institutions. The 
latter would be charged with fire-fighting, maintenance of public order, the resolution of 
minor conflicts, and the setting of tax rates. 
 Guilds: European urban economies of this period were dominated by guilds. 
Merchant guilds regulated the world of trade, craft guilds the urban industries. Merchant 
guilds emerged before craft guilds, and also began to disappear earlier. The craft guilds 
started to appear in serious numbers during the fourteenth century and were abolished in 
most continental European countries during the revolutionary era around 1800; in 
England they were never formally abolished, of course. The economic role of guilds 
remains a much contested issue,20 but there can be no doubt that these institutions 
integrated vast numbers of native and migrant inhabitants into urban society, through 
apprenticeships that encompassed not just economic skills, but also a training in public 
behaviour. Guilds, moreover, might provide welfare provisions and political influence, as 
in more than a few towns (including London) they were directly involved in municipal 
government. To become a member of a guild, formal citizen status was a requirement 
almost everywhere, but this did not apply to the masters’ journeymen and apprentices. 
 Welfare: Whereas the urban poor would be excluded from municipal office or the 
guilds, they were tied into the urban community through the welfare provisions supplied 
                                                 
18 Miller (2008), 181-85; Halliday (1998), ch’s 6-7; Dee (2009), 51-59, 76-82, 98-101. 
19 Friedrichs (2000), 13. 
20 Epstein and Prak (2008); Ogilvie (2010). 
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by a host of local institutions.21 Many of these institutions were set up by the church, and 
even in areas where they became secularised later on, they were normally not operated by 
local governments, but as foundations. While local authorities might subsidise such 
foundations, and supervise and coordinate their actions, the majority of welfare 
provisioning remained privately operated. 
 Civic militias: European towns were institutionally defined by their privileges, but 
geographically by their walls, and later ramparts. During the Middle Ages urbanites were 
expected to defend their town, and also to accompany their lord on military campaigns. 
Urban troops were usually raised through the guilds or by neighbourhood. From the 16th 
century onwards, professional troops took over many of the military tasks, but civic 
militias remained significant as police forces. They were also seen as an important 
element of civic identity, and were the focal point of urban protest, especially in towns 
where other political channels were absent. 
 European citizenship was thus defined by a variety of institutional settings that 
provided a significant proportion of urbanites with agency and a stake in the local 
community. Even though the details varied, such arrangements could be found 
throughout pre-modern Europe. Two significant variations can be observed in time and 
space, however. Generally speaking, the later Middle Ages saw probably the largest 
extension of urban autonomy. Expanding states started to clamp down on urban freedoms 
from the sixteenth century onwards in many parts of Europe. This points to another 
pattern of variation: in some regions of Europe towns were directly or indirectly involved 
in the formulation of state policies—most obviously, of course, in Renaissance Italy, 
where cities and states tended to coincide, later also in the Low Countries, and later still 
in the British Isles; in others they were not. 
 
 
2. China 
The single most striking aspect of China’s institutional history is no doubt the longevity 
of its system of rule. There may have been interruptions, there were changes in ruling 
dynasties, the borders changed and were at times overrun by invaders, but when all is 
                                                 
21 The best survey remains Lis and Soly (1979) 
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said and done, China’s imperial structure survived in its basic form from 220 BC to the 
overthrow of the last Qing Emperor in 1911, i.e. for more than 2,000 years. No European 
polity comes even close to that. China’s emperors were themselves convinced that this 
was the result of their benevolent attitude towards their subjects, an opinion recently 
given a new lease of life by Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Bin Wong, who in their analyses 
of the different developmental trajectories of Europe and China have portrayed the light 
and usually peaceful touch of China’s system of governance, with the high levels of 
military spending and related low levels of taxation as, paradoxically, perhaps the main 
reason why the Industrial Revolution was more likely to take off in Europe.22 However, 
most historians, including those whose work Weber had so carefully studied one hundred 
years ago, saw China’s Emperors as brutal oppressors, determined to nip the emergence 
of any potential rivals in the bud. Such potential rivals included independent local 
authorities as well as commercials social classes. As a result, according to these authors, 
China remained an agrarian and bureaucratic empire, the fate of which was very much 
determined by policies developed in the capital and the imperial court. 
 Two shifts in the historiography of late Imperial China have started to cast doubt 
on this interpretation. The first is an increasing realization that, if the Kings of England, 
France and Spain were having massive problems controlling the outer regions of their 
domains because of the logistical problems they faced in an era of slow communications, 
how on earth would the Chinese have been able to overcome the handicaps of distance?23 
And as it turns out, like their European counterparts they could not, and were thus in the 
same position of having to allow regional and local authorities substantial freedom of 
action, provided these observed certain basic elements of the deal with the political 
centre. Those included loyalty to the imperial system and resistance against attempts at 
devolution, maintenance of public order, and the procurement of revenue to support the 
central military and bureaucratic apparatus. 
 The second shift concerns the socio-economic character of the Chinese Empire. 
There is no doubt that China was still overwhelmingly rural in the late eighteenth 
century. However, it is easy to overlook that Europe too was in that position. Even in 
                                                 
22 Rosenthal and Wong (2011). 
23 Skinner (1977b), 19-21 
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1800, less than ten per cent of European lived in an urban community of 10,000 or more 
inhabitants. In some countries that percentage, as we saw, was substantially higher, but 
many other parts of Europe were distinctly less urbanised. For late nineteenth-century 
China, an urban percentage of 5-6 has been proposed.24 Clearly, this is lower than the 
European average, but not completely out of range. Some regions, most notably the 
Lower Yangtze delta, may have come close to ten per cent, a figure comparable to 
Germany’s in the mid-nineteenth century.25 It could, moreover, have been higher in 
earlier times. Skinner estimates that in the thirteenth century, after what has been termed 
China’s ‘urban revolution’, levels of urbanisation in the Lower Yangtze delta were two 
percentage points higher than in the middle of the nineteenth century—and possibly 
more.26 We should, moreover, never forget that during the pre-modern era perhaps as 
much as half of the world’s urban population lived in Chinese towns and cities.27 
 
Urban governance 
Chinese towns did not have the same type of formal status as was created by urban 
privileges in Europe. They were and remained formally part of a hierarchical structure of 
public administration. As a result, the highest authority in towns was exercised by 
officials appointed by the Emperor and his government. In practice, however, this small 
group of outsiders depended heavily on the cooperation of, and self-organisation by, local 
inhabitants. In the nineteenth century ‘many, if not most of the urban services were 
provided by nongovernmental corporate groups and financed through assessments and 
dues [levied by these groups] or the income from corporate property’, according to 
William Skinner. Urban leadership developed out of the local gentry and merchants, who 
used these organisations as a power base, but were also constrained by the membership’s 
aspirations and expectations, and the organisations’ modus operandi.28 Three distinct but 
at the same time overlapping forms of self-organisation were especially important in the 
towns and cities of Ming and Qing China: the guilds and benevolent societies, to be 
                                                 
24 Rozman (1973), 279-85. 
25 de Vries (1984), 45. 
26 Skinner (1977b), 23, 28; Skinner (1977c), 226, 229; also Fei (2009), 1, 9. 
27 Rozman (1973), 6; See also Skinner (1977d), 345; Cartier (2002). 
28 Skinner (1977e), 548(quote)-49. 
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discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter, and the neighbourhood organisations 
that will be the focus of this section. 
 In nineteenth-century Hankou neighbourhoods could be sealed off by special 
gates or doors, creating a domain of communal safety. The identity of the neighbourhood 
was reinforced by the common worship at the neighbourhood temple. Already in the 
eighteenth century, neighbourhood officials (pao-chia) had been introduced in Hankou to 
register the inhabitants and distribute communal tasks among them. The head of the ward 
(pao-cheng) was made responsible for public order, and for assessing inhabitants for tax 
purposes. The same official was also involved in the provisioning of social welfare and 
other public services. Officially the appointment was for one year only, probably to 
prevent abuses, but already in the eighteenth century a limited number of families seems 
to have cornered most of the appointments, suggesting that the position was one of real 
influence.29 
 The ward officials were in a delicate position as intermediaries between the local 
authorities and their neighbourhood constituents, as is demonstrated by protests in 
seventeenth-century Nanjing. In 1609 petitions were submitted against labour services, 
including the nightwatch, enforced by neighbourhood captains. Protesters were also 
unhappy with the fact that gentry families were not included in this type of duty. They 
demanded a conversion into monetary contributions, and at the same time insisted on the 
introduction of financial budgets that would be open to public scrutiny. Such petitions 
were a customary channel of communication between citizens and authorities at the time. 
Flyers, folk songs and theatre performances were also utilised to mobilise public opinion 
in seventeenth-century Chinese towns. Citizens’ opinions were sought, for example about 
the introduction of new local taxes. When Ding Bin, an important official in Nanjing, was 
confronted with the protests against the nightwatch, he consulted delegations of rich and 
poor representatives from the city’s neighbourhoods, convened a meeting of all ward 
censors, another with government representatives, and finally paid visits to householders 
in various parts of the city. Clearly, he tried to create a platform of consensus before 
introducing new legislation.30 
                                                 
29 Rowe (1989), 81-82, 297, 301-03, 313. 
30 Fei (2009), 29-62, 95.  
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 Although historians of pre-modern China tend to insist on the absence of much 
public unrest31 compared to the rebelliousness of European towns, protest did occur in 
China too. As in Nanjing, the citizens of Hangzhou were dissatisfied by the labour 
services they were supposed to provide and wanted them converted into money 
payments. A large-scale uprising, mobilising over 2,000 people in 1582, had to be put 
down with military force.32 In seventeenth-century Suzhou, merchants tried to prevent an 
expansion of the city walls because that would mean the tearing down of their properties. 
Inhabitants of Gaochun organised five petition campaigns in protest against the building 
of new walls. Such campaigns were well-organised, by people who were aware of the 
relevant legislation and tried to use that to their advantage.33 
 The existence of urban citizen organisations—and Skinner has pointed out that 
even in overseas Chinese communities self-governance was the norm34—has given rise to 
an intense debate about the existence of a ‘public sphere’ in pre-modern China, similar to 
what Jürgen Habermas saw as the foundation of democracy in Europe. The problem is 
the slipperiness of the concept itself. Even in Europe itself there have been widely 
diverging interpretations, and by implication different dates of its emergence have been 
proposed, contesting Habermas’ own claim that it happened only in the second half of the 
eighteenth century.35 However, the essence of Habermas’ idea was that at some point the 
conditions for a genuine public debate about public policies had emerged that the 
authorities could not ignore and that thus helped to shape those policies. Did such a thing 
exist in China. Well, ‘yes and no’ seems to be the best answer.36 No, because some 
elements of the concept were clearly missing in China, such as a national press that could 
address issues of national concern, the natural rights that many eighteenth-century 
reformers invoked to make their case, or the social contract that had been so dear to 
reformers of an earlier era.37 At the same time, other features were available in China, 
                                                 
31 E.g. Rowe (1989), 207-15. 
32 Fuma (1993), 65-70. 
33 Fei (2009), 94, 101, 112. 
34 Skinner (1977e), 551. 
35 Calhoun (1992), ch’s 8-13. 
36 The most important contributions, by Huang, Rankin, Rowe, and Wakeman, were published in a special 
issue of Modern China 19 (1993), and later published as a separate volume, edited by Timothy Brook and 
Michael Frolic (1997). 
37 Rowe (1993), 149, 153. 
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including some of the most important such as ‘social associations not dominated by the 
state’ that could act as intermediaries between the state and its citizens.38 Ultimately, we 
have to decide what are the most significant elements, while reminding ourselves that the 
‘public sphere’ in nineteenth-century Europe was confined to a quite narrow group of 
people in most countries. Taking everything into account, the difference between China 
and Europe seems one of degree rather than of principle. The most important problem at 
this point, given the paucity of research on pre-modern Chinese urban history, is to gauge 
the weight of these self-governing organisations in the governance of Chinese towns. 
This will therefore leave room for disagreements about the precise role of citizens. 
 
Guilds 
One such type of institutions was the guild. Guilds were a prominent feature of urban life 
in China in the Late Imperial period. Information about their nineteenth-century 
incarnations provides a rich picture of their role in urban life and this suggests that they 
were late-blossomers compared to European guilds. On the basis of a survey made after 
the fall of the last emperor in 1911 but proclaiming to start in 1655, Christine Moll-
Murata, in the most thorough review of the evidence to date, has concluded that Chinese 
guilds were mainly a phenomenon of the nineteenth century, albeit with early roots in the 
sixteenth. Other evidence also shows that the nineteenth century saw a massive expansion 
of the guild system in China, usually ascribed to the combined effects of economic 
opportunities of trade expansion and the political and military insecurities of the late 
Qing period. There is, however, the possibility that her source seriously underestimates 
earlier guild numbers. Her graph indicates fewer than forty for all of China between 1644 
and 1720, while William Rowe has counted fifteen guild foundations in Hankou alone 
during that same period. And let’s not forget that Hankou was basically a new town, 
established not long before 1644.39 Beijing, which of course was very much older, 
already had seventy guilds before the end of the Ming. Subsequently, the number 
increased to 220 by the end of the eighteenth century, when Moll-Murata’s data still 
                                                 
38 Rankin (1993), 159 (quote); Huang (1993). 
39 Moll-Murata (2008), 247; Rowe (1984), 277. 
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show a weak guild presence.40 Early references to guilds go back to the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries.41 All of this seems to suggest that the numbers of Chinese guilds 
may have become substantial possibly two centuries after the European guild revolutions 
of the fourteenth century, while in China they also continued for a century and a half 
longer than in Europe. 
 In the beginning, guilds in China were temple associations.42 Temples would 
provide meeting space, and common worship acted as a focus for activities and solidarity. 
The basis for the organisation, especially in the early stages of guild foundations, was 
almost always the common origin of the membership from a particular region, possibly 
combined with a shared profession. In Hankou, out of 28 guilds created before 1795 just 
six were purely professional, the others either based in shared origins, or a combination 
of origin and profession. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did purely 
professional organisations gain the upper hand.43 Their roots are usually associated with 
the importance attached by the Chinese to be buried with their relatives, and the 
organisations have therefore also been called ‘native place lodges.44 This led Weber to 
conclude that Chinese guilds reinforced what he saw as a backward attachment to the 
lineage.45 Returning the corpses of deceased members to their native places was and 
remained indeed an important feature of these guilds, but it is an unacceptable reduction 
of their function to focus on just this aspect. 
 Next to the maintenance of ties with the region of origin, their single most 
important goal seems to have been to create stability for their trade. They regulated 
weights and measures, set prices (usually in conjunction with the local authorities), 
maintained codes of professional conduct, and lobbied local government to promote the 
interests of the membership. For those familiar with European guilds, the most notable 
difference is the absence of ‘monopolies’. There is no hint of an exclusive access to 
particular trades for the members of this or that guild. Membership was anyway available 
                                                 
40 Belsky (2005), 41-42. 
41 Moll-Murata (2008), 218.  
42 Goodman (1995), 91-92. 
43 Rowe (1984), 277; Goodman (1995), 119-21, 137-38. 
44 Belsky (2005), 6. 
45 Weber && 
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to everyone who fitted the membership profile, i.e. originated from the region, or was 
active in the profession covered by the guild.46 
 Guilds would hold meetings where members could discuss issues of common 
concern. Inevitably, some families would become prominent as guild officers and occupy 
more than what was perhaps their fair share of appointments. There are, however, 
recorded examples of ordinary members exposing to the local authorities abuses in their 
guild, suggesting that the dominance of such prominent members was constrained by an 
outside authority. Common worship of patron deities helped reinforce the bonds of 
solidarity within the guild community, as did the extensive building programmes that 
many guilds undertook. Usually starting off with a temple cum meeting place, guilds 
would ultimately own huge compounds that included hostels for itinerant merchants and 
artisans, and a stage for the performance of plays and operas. The Hui-chan guild of 
Hankou, for example, owned a small temple complex in the suburbs, when in 1694 
twenty-four of the most prominent members decided to raise money for a new and more 
conspicuous set of buildings located within the town walls. The compound would consist 
of around one hundred different rooms. In 1717 a new West Hall was added, in 1721 
another lecture hall. The complex came to occupy a substantial part of a new street, Hsin-
an Street that was maintained by the guild and leading to a pier in the river also built and 
maintained by the guild. When the pier was destroyed by floods in 1796, members could 
supply funds for its reconstruction in exchange for bonds.47 As will be discussed shortly, 
guilds were also important providers of social assistance. 
These guilds were initiated by the members themselves, and could expect to be 
sanctioned by the government,48 either in writing or otherwise in practice. As we already 
saw, they became an increasingly important feature of urban governance. Surveying the 
evidence, it seems fair to say that Chinese guilds were first and foremost civic 
organisations that sought to integrate their mobile membership into the framework of the 
urban community, while at the same time allowing the urban authorities a channel into 
the worlds of migrants, businessmen, and the crafts. 
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Poor relief 
China had a rudimentary system of social welfare that swung into action especially in 
times of food scarcity but also during other major catastrophes. This was the well-known 
granary system, maintained by the government throughout the empire.49 On top of that, 
the authorities tried to control prices, to provide ordinary people access to food at all 
times. As in other pre-modern societies, price controls only had a limited effect, and there 
was much demand for routine welfare, not least in China’s large urban centres.50 This 
type of welfare was left almost completely to private initiative, albeit with the active 
support of the local authorities. 
 Important providers of welfare were once again the guilds. Their compounds 
would often include hostels providing shelter to mobile workers and merchants.51 More 
importantly, they paid for funerals, sometimes in the guild burial grounds, but also for the 
return of members’ corpses to their native region to be buried there together with their 
forebears.52 Next to the guilds, so-called benevolent societies (shan-t‘ang) emerged in the 
late sixteenth century. The first two were set up in 1590 in Yucheng, in the Lower 
Yangzhi delta, but the model then quickly spread to other towns and cities. The original 
source of inspiration were societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals; the poor 
were portrayed as similarly hapless creatures, who had to be rescued from the worst 
excesses of their dependence on more powerful humans. The benevolent societies had 
limited membership, with each member pledging to contribute a certain amount of money 
and time to the cause. They were almost exclusively urban organisations. The division of 
labour with the guilds remained quite unclear. In some instances the benevolent society 
seems to have been a subdivision of the guild, in other cases it was a parallel 
organisation, and in still others it was completely separate from the guild. Benevolent 
societies did, however, employ the guild model for their own organisation. They also 
owned property and kept written records of their financial transactions. Beside food, they 
provided medical assistance, in an attempt to prevent outbreaks of epidemic diseases.53 
To be eligible for charity, poor people had to be recommended. Familiarity with 
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benefactors, and therefore patronage, was an important element of the system. Paupers 
who were caught drinking or gambling could expect to be excluded.54 
 There were strong incentives for charity in pre-modern China. Benefactors would 
advertise their acts in pamphlets, in the expectation that it would enhance their social 
status. Promoting the welfare of society as a whole was promoted by Confucianism as a 
goal worth pursuing and the rich were encouraged to shoulder this type of responsibility. 
It was suggested that members of benevolent societies would hand over as much as ten 
percent of their income. Obviously, charity was also perceived as a prop of the existing 
social order, a vital element in the maintenance of public order, as well as a means to gain 
influence, or at least wax popular with local authorities. During times of crisis, the 
authorities actively supported the work of benevolent societies, as happened for example 
in 1641 in the towns of the Yangzhi delta.55 In the nineteenth century such support 
became more regular, and sometimes even took the form of specific taxes being 
designated to support the work of the benevolent societies.56 Beside poor relief, guilds 
and benevolent societies took on the provisioning of other public services; these included 
fire-fighting, the maintenance of streets—and in the nineteenth century also street 
lighting, bridges, and public parks, as well as ferries, all of them accessible to the general 
public.57 
 Charitable trusts had no legal status and in this formal sense Max Weber was 
correct in his observation that they were different from their European equivalents. In 
practice, however, they owned property, were self-governing, and worked in close 
cooperation with the civic administration.58 As in Europe, they provided a range of 
services to people in need who could make a moral but not a legal claim to be assisted. 
For its beneficiaries, this dimension of citizenship was therefore precarious. 
 
Urban defence 
In spite of Rosenthal and Wong’s claim that, compared to Europe, China was a relatively 
peaceful society, Chinese towns were heavily fortified. As a matter of fact, the Chinese 
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character cheng can mean ‘wall’ as well as ‘city’. In modern Chinese the word for town 
is chengshi, a combination of ‘wall’ and ‘market’. It is therefore fair to say that urban 
defences were an integral part of the whole urban concept. Although precise figures are 
lacking, the number of walled towns in pre-modern China is reckoned to have numbered 
several thousand. Especially during the Ming, town walls were constructed and 
reconstructed on a scale unprecedented in world history.59 This was not always popular. 
As we saw, Nanjing citizens whose houses would be destroyed by the new ramparts 
protested vehemently.60 
 These towns were guarded by permanent garrisons, and I found no traces of a 
parallel organisation of civic militias recruited from the ranks of the inhabitants. 
However, in 1799 during the White Lotus rebellion, and again in 1853 during the 
Taiping, the guilds of Hankou helped organise local defence.61 This also happened in 
other towns during the Taiping, such as Shanghai where 500 ‘braves’ were recruited in 
1860.62 In seventeenth-century Nanjing there are hints of a (controversial) nightwatch 
recruited from among the inhabitants, but it is impossible to say with any certainty that 
this was an equivalent of the European militia system.63 It seems that medieval Chinese 
towns did have a system of watches (huofu), manned by towns’ inhabitants. They were to 
patrol the walled cities and their suburbs at night. During the sixteenth century 
participation in the nightwatch was converted into a cash payment, and thus became part 
of the fiscal system instead of the system of labour services. In Hangzhou this happened 
after protests by citizens who were fed up with this and other forced labour 
contributions.64 In 1641 it was suggested in Taicang that the members of the local 
benevolent society would take up archery practice, but nothing seems to have happened.65 
This absence might be related to the claim that China was a relatively peaceful 
society. The fact is, however, that China was plagued, at intervals, by large-scale and 
destructive domestic conflict, for example during the Ming-Qing transition of the 
seventeenth century, the White Lotus rebellion of the late eighteenth century, and the 
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Taiping rebellion of the nineteenth. The elaborate fortification of Chinese towns also 
seems to contradict the idea that peace was the default situation in China. It was, to say 
the least, not taken for granted by Chinese towns themselves. It is possible, however, that 
the pattern of domestic violence in China was different: instead of relatively small 
incidents separated by short intervals, China may have suffered from a pattern of rare, but 
extraordinarily intense domestic conflict that made a militia system less practical. 
 
China’s pre-modern citizenship regime 
In a recent paper Debin Ma has argued that Europe’s advance over China should be 
explained as a result of principal-agent flaws in the Chinese state—in other words as a 
problem of citizenship. The preceding survey adds ammunition to that argument, but with 
a twist. Rather than the oppressive nature highlighted by previous generations of scholars, 
Ma sees the weakness of the central government as its major flaw. Yes, it was remarkably 
stable compared to its European counterparts, and also managed to make do with low 
levels of taxation. The result, however, according to Ma’s argument, was that local levels 
of government had hardly any money to spend. Therefore, they had to raise revenue 
informally, creating a system that was riddled by corruption. The quickest way to get rich 
in China, it seems, was by exploiting ordinary folk.66 That is not quite the way it looks 
from the bottom up. Our investigation strongly suggests an urban society with substantial 
autonomy, a robust civil society, significant levels of citizen organisation with active 
craft and merchant guilds, as well as social welfare provisions cutting across lineage 
solidarities. We found few traces, however, of military forms of citizenship.  
 
3. Near East 
Although it has a different shape, for example because of an important French strand, the 
historiography of the Near East67 has gone through a trajectory not unlike the Chinese. 
Weber’s picture of the region’s social make-up as atomistic and clan-based—a structure 
that he saw reflected in the shape of its towns with their narrow winding alleys and 
courtyards hidden from view—dominated historians’ portrayals of the past for much of 
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the twentieth century. The indigenous people, in this version of their history, were 
oppressed by an empire whose elites were pastoralists with a strong military outlook. 
Urban interests were merely tolerated, and only encouraged for fiscal reasons. The central 
government took little notice, and urban pressure groups were no match for bureaucrats. 
The region’s economic underdevelopment was an almost inevitable result of this fixated 
socio-political structure.  
Two things have changed in recent decades. Scholars have stopped taking at face 
value the self-portrait provided by documents from the central archives. Instead, the 
Ottoman Empire in particular, has come to be portrayed as a remarkably flexible 
organisation. As Şevket Pamuk put it: ‘The Ottomans were flexible and pragmatic from 
the start’.68 While the picture of the top of the pyramid was changing, new perspectives 
also emerged on its foundations. Scholars called into question the idea of a powerless 
society.69 A range of arguments was put forward to question Weber’s portrayal. It was, 
for example, pointed out that the cities of the Near East had been among the most 
populous and most advanced of Eurasia during the 9th—11th centuries, when Europeans 
were still trying to come to terms with the trauma’s of the collapse of the Roman 
Empire.70 Also during the Ottoman period (early 16th to early 20th centuries) did the 
major cities of the region, after a period of decay, grow to sizes in the same range as 
Europe’s metropolises; not exactly a sign of stunted development.71 More importantly 
still, in the context of this paper, scholars began to uncover a rich communal life in these 
cities that seemed to contradict the claim that society was constrained by family and clan 
structures.72 These shifts have rejuvenated the debate about ‘the Islamic city’. The whole 
concept is now very much in doubt, even in the revised version that was launched by Ira 
Lapidus in his famous 1967 book Muslim cities in the later Middle Ages. In that book 
Lapidus questioned Weber’s portrait of the Middle East, but then sought to replace it by a 
superior version, informed by a deep knowledge of the available sources in Arabic that 
had been inaccessible to Weber himself. Lapidus demonstrated persuasively that the 
cities he concentrated on, Aleppo in Syria and Cairo, had communal structures, 
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specifically neighbourhoods, religious communities, and brotherhoods and youth 
associations, all of which shaped the lives of urbanites. However, none of these had the 
kind of independence allotted to European corporations he insisted, as urban governance 
remained the purview of bureaucrats appointed by the central government.73 Recent 
voices in the debate object that the whole concept suggests that religion was somehow the 
defining characteristic of these societies, that many of the generalisations were using one 
or two examples to characterise a huge area stretching from Morocco to the Iranian 
border and beyond, and that the whole idea of using the European experience as a 
template made it impossible to think about the Near East on its own terms.74 
This critique has not managed to put the ‘essentialist’ approach to the urban life in 
the Near East completely to rest.75 Nonetheless, in what follows we will want to trace the 
details of local organisation in the towns and the cities of the Near East, without 
assuming beforehand that they were inferior to those of the West, or that they were 
completely dominated by the central government institutions. At the same time, we will 
want to avoid the pitfall of assuming that the presence of identical elements somehow 
imply that the structures they made together must therefore have been identical as well. 
For reasons that will become clear in due course, the military and economic dimensions 
of citizenship (militias and guilds) will be discussed together rather than separately in this 
section. 
 
Urban governance 
Under Ottoman rule, cities had no independent statute. The highest local authority was 
the governor, or pasha, and he would always be appointed by the central government. 
The same applied to other high offices. This was most obviously so in the capital 
Istanbul, where the imperial and local governments were almost indistinguishable, but it 
applied equally in major towns such as Aleppo, Cairo or Damascus.76 When looking at 
systems of local governance from a formal point of view, there is no denying that it was a 
mere branch of the central executive. Still, in day to day practice the situation was not 
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exactly so black-and-white, as we can see from local politics in eighteenth-century 
Aleppo. 
 Located in the north of what is now Syria, Aleppo at the time had c. 100,000 
inhabitants, and was of course best known for its international trade.77 Due to this long-
distance commerce, Aleppo was a city with an ethnically as well as religiously mixed 
population. Such mixtures were characteristic of all major cities in the Ottoman Empire. 
As everywhere else, the highest official was the pasha, who was appointed for one year 
only, and then moved on to a similar posting somewhere else in the Empire. The first was 
appointed in 1520, shortly after the arrival of the Ottomans. Their invasion had been 
welcomed by Aleppo’s inhabitants, who had suffered from many abuses under the 
preceding Mamluk regime.78 The governor was primarily responsible for the military 
security of the city and its hinterland, and had to ensure the transfer of tax revenues to 
Istanbul. He was in charge of the Janissary garrison, but also had his own forces which 
were mainly used for controlling the countryside and ensuring the regular flow of 
revenue. 
 The governor was theoretically in complete charge of Aleppo; in practice he 
enlisted the help of many others. For one, he was advised by a council, or divan, 
composed of important local officials and notables; it was ‘the most important formal 
setting for local participation in policymaking’. Its membership included the qadi, who 
was the highest judicial official and like the pasha appointed by Istanbul, a variable 
number of a‘yan, or local notables, the leading ulama (religious leader), the head of the 
asharaf, who were families that claimed direct descent from the Prophet, and finally the 
commanding officer of the Janissary corps. This council met regularly, but no minutes 
were taken.79 The a‘yan have been characterised as ‘local gentry’. They owned landed 
properties in the region, but their power came mainly from their hereditary control over 
tax farms. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these families were in the 
ascendant. Their dominance was, however, checked by other groups in the city. 
 On the one hand there were the asharaf, an especially coherent sub-set of the 
Muslim community. The Muslims were about eighty per cent of the population, 
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Christians another fifteen per cent, with Jews making up most of the remaining five per 
cent.80 On the other hand were the Janissaries, the garrison of professional soldiers who 
became increasingly integrated in the local artisan and working class community. The 
Janissaries, who were 5-10,000 strong, were a particularly active political force. They 
fought pitched battles with the governor’s own dali troops, for example in 1775 when the 
Janissaries refused to accompany the governor on a military campaign and managed to 
oust him from the city. They were supported in their protests by a large file of 
complaints, collected by the qadi from various sections of the local population. In 1784 
the Janissaries again removed a pasha from office and from the city itself, and in the 
early years of the nineteenth century they were effectively masters of the city.81 The 
Janissaries relied on support from the guilds and neighbourhoods, as well as on their own 
weapons. 
 Neighbourhoods and guilds were equally important in Cairo. The Egyptian 
capital, like Aleppo, was governed by a pasha and qadi, both appointed by the central 
government. At the same time, it showed ‘a high level of popular dissent’.82 The city was 
subdivided into 53 neighbourhoods, each headed by a neighbourhood leader, or shaykh 
al-hārah.83 Their responsibilities were to maintain public order, and help collect local 
taxes.84 Next to the neighbourhoods, a large number of guilds organised the local 
population on a professional basis. Janisseries were active participants in Cairo’s local 
politics, much as they were in Aleppo. In other words, the city had a plethora of 
community organisations, endorsed by the government but not completely controlled by 
it.85 This was true of Ottoman cities more generally.86 The balance might vary from one 
town to another, but local community organisations were found everywhere as active 
participants in urban governance.87 In times of crisis, they provided the contexts for 
articulating grievances, and mobilising the forces of opposition.88 
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 The Medieval period, i.e. the centuries before the arrival of the Ottomans, is 
unfortunately poorly documented. The most authoritative work by far on the period, 
Lapidus’ 1967 book, displays a strong emphasis on the dominance of the Mamluk 
conquerors that must strike the twenty-first-century reader as out of balance.89 Other 
evidence is hard to come by. In Cairo, we are told, the Ottomans preserved much of the 
institutional structure as they found it when conquering the city in 1517.90 The level of 
public services in medieval Cairo was, moreover, unheard of in Western Europe with its 
presumably superior urban institutions. Cairo had street lighting in the Mamluk period, 
whereas Amsterdam was the first Western European city to introduce this—in the late 
seventeenth century. Cairo’s Great Hospital, built in the late thirteenth century, provided 
patients with their own beds and bed clothes, as well as private chamber pots, despite its 
capacity of 6,000.91 Were these fruits of superior centralised power, or the results of a 
deep commitment to the local community? We simply do not know at this point. 
 
Economic and military protection 
Craft and merchant guilds were a common phenomenon in Ottoman towns and cities. 
Especially those of Istanbul, Aleppo, Jerusalem and Cairo—all among the larger cities of 
the Empire and Istanbul and Cairo indeed of the pre-modern world more generally—have 
been studied in such detail that we can discuss them with confidence. One thing that the 
modern scholarship on Ottoman guilds has achieved is to dispel the idea that these were 
mere instruments in the hands of the authorities to oversee and control the mass of the 
population.92 Instead, a much richer picture has emerged.93 As in Europe, the 
organisational form of the guild was not clearly distinguished from other community 
organisations, but for purposes of comparison we are focusing here on professional 
guilds, whose membership consisted of people with similar professions, either as 
craftsmen, or as shopkeepers and merchants, or working in the service sector. This would 
therefore include the water carriers, for instance, a profession unknown to the best of my 
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knowledge in Western Europe; the membership of the Cairo water carriers’ guild 
numbered over 3,000 in the eighteenth century.94 
 Guilds were numerous, as well as popular in the sense that they organised a very 
substantial part of urban populations in the Ottoman Empire.95 Istanbul had 76 guilds in 
the beginning of the seventeenth century and possibly twice that number by the end of the 
century.96 Eighteenth-century Cairo numbered 200-250 guilds, out of which 39 had a 
membership of 1,000 and more.97 It is, unfortunately, very unclear how and especially 
when they originated. There can be no doubt that guilds existed in Byzantium as late as 
the twelfth century, if not necessarily in the provinces. Some of these guilds were 
initiated by the state, others by craftsmen themselves.98 Some scholars claim that they 
disappeared afterwards and were only revived by the Ottoman authorities, which would 
then help explain their top-down mode of operation.99 Cairo, however, had professional 
organisations before the arrival of the Ottomans.100 Given the current state of scholarship, 
there is no way we will be able to decide here one way or another. The fact of the matter 
is that we only have information about the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 It is possible that some of these guilds were created on the authorities’ initiative, 
but it is unlikely that this was always what happened.101 It is therefore better to describe 
the guilds as an interface between the members and the authorities. The election of guild 
officials is a case in point. The headmen, usually known as shaykh, were officially 
appointed by a judge, or qadi, but their names were put forward by the members 
themselves. Moreover, a delegation of the members had to confirm before the qadi that 
they were willing to accept the shaykh as their headman. Even if they did, they might lose 
faith in the shaykh later on, and there are quite a few instances of guilds asking the court 
to dismiss their shaykh—and of the courts acting on such a proposal. Guilds in Cairo had 
such power over their own governors, but this was likewise true in Istanbul, despite the 
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close control that the government imposed on its capital city.102 Another indication of the 
guilds’ relative autonomy were the membership meetings, where issues relating to the 
trade would be discussed.103 There is no clear indication, however, that they had their 
own sources of income. 
 Ottoman guilds regulated the trade, in the sense that they might set quality 
controls and prices for both raw materials and final products. All of this would happen in 
consultation with the authorities, but not necessarily on the initiative of those authorities. 
Guilds regularly made their wishes known by petitioning the authorities, and it seems that 
their proposals were usually accepted and absorbed into the body of regulatory 
documents. The shaykh was the arbiter in trade disputes. Ottoman guilds also had an 
important role in the collection of taxes, possibly more significant than their European 
counterparts, although these too were sometimes made responsible for the collection of 
excises, depending on the trade. Like European craftsmen and shopkeepers, guilds in the 
Ottoman Empire were infused with an ideology of equality. 
 The Ottoman guilds provided only limited social assistance. They did not have 
funds set aside for that purpose, let alone separate institutions to take care of members in 
their old age or those falling ill. However, they did organise festivities that could 
reinforce ties of solidarity within the guild community, as well as common meals. 
Istanbul guilds were known to organise days out in the countryside, complete with picnic 
baskets to refresh the participants during the trip.104 Those in Cairo would participate in 
public parades with their own float, drawn by two asses.105 
 
Whereas in Europe the guilds, insofar as they had military functions, seem to have lost 
them in the Early Modern period, the opposite happened in the Ottoman Empire. During 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries members of the Janissary infantry troops 
increasingly joined the guilds. They did so for economic reasons. These troops would be 
stationed as permanent garrisons in particular towns, with little else on their hands than 
the occasional watch. Their pay scales reflected the low intensity of their military duties, 
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and this forced many Janissaries into civilian side-jobs. Because the Janissaries corps 
held various privileges, in taxation and otherwise, a reverse movement was 
simultaneously taking place: individual craftsmen and traders would join a corps to enjoy 
the privileges and also the protection such an armed organisation was offering. Clearly, 
there was a price to be paid, usually 5-10 percent of one’s capital at death. But many 
considered it a price worth paying.  
As a result of this double movement, the world of the guilds and the world of the 
military became intimately related. Guilds did not usually involve themselves in local 
politics, outside the realm of their professions.106 This in itself may have contributed to 
the impression that they were somehow different and less effective than European guilds. 
Perhaps, however, historians have been looking in the wrong places. Even when the 
guilds were mostly quiet, their Janissary members were politically very active indeed. In 
Aleppo they became one of the most important political forces during the second half of 
the eighteenth century.107 
 
Welfare 
Provisioning for the poor (zakat) is one of the Five Pillars of Islam. Together with the 
voluntary alms (sadaqa) it is mentioned explicitly in the Quran as a means to please God. 
Biographies of important figures would never fail to mention their contribution to such 
pious causes.108 Islamic welfare was, at the same time, handicapped by the absence of a 
formal church organisation that could coordinate charity.109 Having said that, the towns 
and cities of the Near East had their fair share of charities, including pensioners’ homes, 
hospitals, caravanserais, funds for the release of prisoners of war, as well as the poor 
relief provided by religious organisations.110 At in Europe it is difficult to detect a system 
in the variety of charities. Nonetheless, two types of welfare seem to have been especially 
common in the region. 
 The first of these systems was neighbourhood welfare. In eighteenth-century 
Aleppo, the headman of the neighbourhood collected funds for a range of public services. 
                                                 
106 For guild riots in Istanbul, however, Yi (2004), 213-32. 
107 Bodman (1963), 106-25; Masters (1989), 73, 83-93; Raymond (2002), 67-74. 
108 Lev (2005), 4, 21, 28. 
109 Lev (2005), 157; Marcus (1989), 212. 
110 Lev (2005), ch. 6. 
 28
These included the maintenance of public spaces, the removal of waste, as well as 
welfare for resident paupers.111 The second system consisted of the well-known waqfs. 
These were usually urban institutions.112 Technically, a waqf was ‘an object which was 
endowed to a specific purpose for eternity’.113 They were usually set up by well-off 
donors, and these could include the Sultan himself. Ottoman sultans created important 
institutions with a waqf governance structure in all important cities of their empire. These 
waqf foundations included mosques, madrassas (i.e. religious schools) and also welfare 
institutions. Other waqfs were set up by local elites, and might acquire additional funding 
in the course of time. 
 The waqfs have been criticised, most recently by Timur Kuran, as one of the 
institutions holding back the economic development of pre-modern Islamic societies. 
They compared unfavourably with European corporations because they were family 
rather than community-based, and because their governance structure was set in stone by 
the founders; Islamic law did not permit changes.114 The comparison is unnecessarily 
critical of the waqf for two reasons. First, the appropriate counterpart in Europe was the 
foundation rather than the corporation.115 Foundations were very common in the realm of 
welfare, often retained strong links with the family of the patron and could be as long-
lasting and inflexible as a waqf.116 Secondly, Islamic jurisprudence did acknowledge 
changing practices; for the waqf, this dynamic has recently been described as ‘a dialectic 
between practice and legal theory’.117 
 
Cities, citizenship and the state in the Ottoman Empire 
The whole issue of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire hinges on one’s evaluation of the 
power of the Ottoman state. Many scholars have argued that it was a strong state, because 
it managed to control local—and more specifically urban—authorities. Others have 
raised objections to this view, pointing out that Islam itself did not acknowledge the state 
as such, but also that the Ottomans were subject to the same technological constraints on 
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communication that limited the effectiveness of other imperial governments seeking to 
dominate large territories.118 The position of the pashas is a case in point. Their annual 
rotation prevented the development of local roots and ‘going native’, forcing them to 
nurture their relationship with the central government. At the same time, it made them 
more dependent on the information from, and collaboration with local elites, who were 
thus able to manipulate the government agents and promote their own agendas.119 The 
stability of the Ottoman Empire has been ascribed by some to precisely this delicate 
balance between central control and local participation. There is general agreement that 
the central government was more in control in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
than later, and that particularly in the course of the eighteenth century it embarked on a 
course of decentralisation. Due to a dearth of local studies it is currently difficult to gauge 
how much local agency the early stages of Ottoman rule allowed for, not to mention the 
centuries preceding the arrival of the Ottomans. 
 With these caveats we can still say that within urban communities the Near East 
displayed various types of organisations that encompassed the inhabitants in passive, but 
also in all kinds of active ways. Neigbourhoods, religious organisations, waqfs, and 
guilds were very much in evidence in urban communities, and even if their role became 
more prominent over the course of time, they already existed in the earlier period. Again, 
it is very much an issue of interpretation how one compares these to their European 
counterparts. Much has been made of their dependence on official permission and 
regulation. There is, however, a strong tendency in the literature to put European 
corporations on a pedestal of complete autonomy, and find similar institutions elsewhere 
falling short of that ideal. The truth of the matter is that complete autonomy was rare in 
Europe itself. Corporations received their privileges from a superior authority and those 
privileges could be revoked. Authorities regularly interfered in the ‘domestic’ 
arrangements of corporations, and insisted on a say in their governance. If they did not 
directly appoint the directors of such corporations, they usually wanted to at least confirm 
the members’ choice. In the Near East, neighbourhoods, guilds and so on were held 
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collectively responsible for their actions. Even if organisations had no legal personality, 
they were routinely treated by the authorities as if they had.120 
 
Conclusion: Citizenship and agency in pre-modern Eurasia 
This comparative history of citizenship-as-practice in late medieval and early modern 
Eurasia points up—as was to be expected—similarities as well as differences. Three 
major points do stand out, however. 
 The first is that there was a lot going on in China and the Middle East that could 
be defined as ‘citizenship’, i.e. established mutual claims and expectations between 
inhabitants and authorities. These claims and expectations were institutionalised in a 
variety of organisational forms that stood at the interface of government and society. 
Even if technically the authorities were ultimately in charge, it was almost impossible to 
determine who under routine circumstances had the final say: the members of various 
local organisations or the authorities. These organisations produced a mixture of public 
and club goods, helping to lubricate social and economic processes. No doubt such 
arrangements were beneficial to the membership of these organisations; otherwise they 
would have been extremely difficult to sustain. However, across Eurasia there seems to 
have been a general understanding that such benefits had a positive impact beyond the 
membership and worked simultaneously for the ‘common good’. Everywhere is Eurasia 
three types of organisations especially created agency for citizens: professional guilds, 
neighbourhoods and religious fraternities. European towns, moreover, had their civic 
militias, not found in a similar form in either China or the Near East. 
 The second is the position of urban government. It is quite clear that as a separate 
institution this was present in Europe and absent elsewhere.121 In both China and the Near 
East local governance was part of the national administrative structure, in Europe it had 
its own position, which was, moreover, articulated in a series of documents that were 
highly valued by European urban communities. Literally, because they were willing to 
spend substantial amounts of money on the obtaining—and later the preservation—of 
such ‘privileges’. As is well known, these urban privileges emerged out of the feudal 
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system in Europe, and other parts of Eurasia simply did not experience a similar 
prolonged period in which central authority was so weak that it had to parcel out its 
sovereign powers. Urban constitutions in Europe created a platform for a specific 
political ideology that we might call ‘urban republicanism’.122 Nothing similar seems to 
have emerged in other parts of Eurasia. Although it is tempting to see this urban 
republicanism as in some way connected to the emergence of capitalism, it has been 
pointed out that in actual fact it was quite opposed to capitalist practices, for example in 
its insistence on social egalitarianism. Urban republicanism was the ideology of the 
craftsman and shopkeeper, not of the merchant-entrepreneur.123 In other words, Europe’s 
urban ideology may have been different, but why it would contribute to a trajectory of 
social development and economic growth, whereas Confucianism and Islam presumably 
held back their respective societies, is not immediately obvious. 
 The third element might provide a solution to the conundrum. This is the position 
of towns and urban interests in the national domain. Because local government was seen 
as a part of the national executive, towns in China or the Near East had no direct 
representation in national policy institutions. They could petition the national 
government, as Istanbul’s guilds used to do in the seventeenth century, or send 
delegations to the capital, as the inhabitants of Aleppo did in 1784 after ousting the 
governor from their city,124 but they had no platform from which to articulate their 
particular demands and interests on a routine basis. In Europe such institutions were 
available to towns, in the form of regional and national parliaments. Having said that, an 
important caveat is in order. It is generally agreed among historians of the period that the 
zenith of urban autonomy was in the late Middle Ages. From the sixteenth century, 
‘voracious states’—I’m borrowing Wim Blockmans’ felicitous phrase—were clamping 
down on urban ‘freedoms’ in much of Northern and Central Europe, but also in France, 
for example, under Louis XIV in the seventeenth century.125 This is significant for two 
reasons. The first is that precisely in this respect there was no pattern that applied 
throughout Europe. French or Polish towns were not obviously more autonomous than 
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those of China or the Near East. They too had to accept very detailed interference from 
the central government. All important officers were appointed by the government, or the 
government would insist on its candidates being ‘elected’. The second reason why this 
matters is because this restriction of urban freedoms and independence, its citizenship if 
you will, was happening precisely during the period when Europe was making its 
economic leap forward. The implication is that contrasting ‘Europe’ against ‘Asia’ is a 
cultural red herring. Instead, what we need is a more specific understanding of the 
citizenship regimes in precisely those areas where Europe’s economy was advancing 
most obviously, i.e. Italy in the late Middle Ages, the Low Countries in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and England in the eighteenth. 
Three distinct stages can be distinguished in the emergence of that dynamic state-city 
interaction. First, in the city-states of Italy during the 11th-14th centuries. In many ways, 
city and state were identical during that stage. Due to their small sizes, however, city-
states were vulnerable to outside threats. The second stage was the urban federation, as it 
emerged in the Low Countries during the sixteenth century, which in the long run again 
suffered from problems of scale, combined with internal sclerosis. The third stage was 
parliamentary rule as it was introduced in England during the Glorious Revolution in 
1689. In all three systems, state policies were to an important extent determined by urban 
interests and their representatives.126 This succession of city-and-state connections looks 
like a more promising explanation for how citizenship contributed to patterns of social 
change and economic growth. Rather than the property regimes highlighted by North c.s., 
which may have been less diverse throughout Europe than they suggest, this paper 
proposes that the combination of citizenship and urban agency in pre-modern states may 
have produced the effect that Weber predicted. 
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